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CRIMINAL LAW
Pro Se Defendants and the
Appointment of Advisory Counsel
by H. Patrick Furman
Criminal Law articles are sponsored
by the CBA Criminal Law Section
and generally are written by prose-
cutors, defense lawyers, and judges
to provide information about case
law, legislation, and advocacy affect-
ing the prosecution, defense, and
administration of criminal cases in
Colorado state and federal courts.
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wo things are clear with regard to
the constitutional right to coun-
sel: everyone charged with a seri-
ous crime has the right to be represent-
ed by counsel, and everyone also has the
right to proceed without counsel. What
is much less clear are the duties and
roles of advisory counsel appointed by
the court to assist a criminal defendant
who is proceeding without counsel but
who, in the court's view, needs assistance
from counsel. This article discusses the
appointment of advisory counsel, the
scope of duties assumed by advisory
counsel, the ethical obligations that ap-
ply to advisory counsel, and considera-
tions for trial judges and prosecutors
dealing with cases in which advisory
counsel has been appointed.
A Brief History of the
Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides that "In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right.., to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." Article II, § 16,
of the Colorado Constitution provides
that "the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by
counsel...."
Initially, only defendants with enough
money to hire an attorney were able to
exercise the right to counsel, but the US.
Supreme Court subsequently held that
"counsel must be provided for defen-
dants unable to employ counsel unless
the right is competently and intelligent-
ly waived."1 Gideon v. Wainwright2 ex-
tended this federal constitutional guar-
antee to state courts through the due
process guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The expansion of the right
to counsel to include those who could not
afford to hire their own attorneys is one
of the most important trends of the crim-
inal justice system in the past fifty
years. The right to counsel is acknowl-
edged by state statute, as well,3 with cer-
tain limits placed on the right to court-
appointed counsel.
4
The flip side is the right to proceed pro
se. As noted, the Colorado Constitution
explicitly acknowledges the right of the
accused to "defend in person."5 The Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has
been interpreted to establish the right to
proceed pro se.6 A trial court may not
"thrust counsel upon the accused,
against his considered wish."7 A defen-
dant's desire to "conduct his own defense
ultimately to his own detriment... must
be honored out ofthat respect for the in-




There is, however, a middle ground be-
tween proceeding with counsel and pro-
ceeding alone. A trial court dealing with
a defendant who wishes to proceed pro
se may appoint advisory counsel.
There is no federal or state constitu-
tional right to advisory counsel. 9 The
only mention of the term in Colorado
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statutes is the preclusion of the Office of
Public Defender from being appointed as
advisory counsel. 10 The authority to ap-
point advisory counsel therefore stems
from case law. Although the case law is
less than clear about the source of this au-
thority, the discretion of the trial court to
make such an appointment is now well-
established."
Types ofAdvisory Counsel
A brief discussion of terms is appropri-
ate at this point. The decisions addressing
the issues relating to advisory counsel
suggest that there are three roles that
counsel might play: that of advisory coun-
sel, stand-by counsel, and hybrid counsel.
Not all courts use these terms in identical
fashion, and some courts do not distin-
guish among these types of counsel at all;
however, it is important to distinguish
these three roles.
Advisory counsel is appointed to assist
the defendant with legal research before
trial and with issues that crop up during
trial, but may well never appear on the
record in front of the jury. Advisory coun-
sel has no decision-making authority with
regard to the presentation of the case.
Stand-by counsel has a role that poten-
tially is much larger than that of advisory
counsel. Stand-by counsel is expected to
be able to jump in and try the case as the
lawyer of record, should the defendant de-
cide he or she no longer wishes to proceed
pro se or become unable to continue with
self-representation. Stand-by counsel
clearly has the ability to act as advisory
counsel, as well, and might shift from an
advisory role to a traditional role during
the pendency of a case.
Finally, hybrid counsel may conduct
certain portions of the proceedings, even
in front of the jury, and act essentially as
co-counsel to the defendant. The defen-
dant conducts the balance of the proceed-
ings and retains ultimate authority as to
the presentation of the case.
The Authority to
Appoint Advisory Counsel
The first Colorado decision addressing
the power to appoint advisory counsel ap-
pears to be Reliford v. People.12 Reliford,
who was charged with second-degree
murder, asked to proceed pro se and the
trial court allowed him to do so. After find-
ing that the trial court adequately advised
the defendant about the perils of proceed-
ingpro se, the Colorado Supreme Court
held that the trial court was not under an
obligation to appoint advisory counsel
over the defendant's objection.The Court
also discussed the power of the trial court
to appoint advisory counsel.
The Reliford court did not identify the
source of the authority to appoint adviso-
ry counsel, although it did note, with ap-
proval, the American Bar Association
Advsor Appelat Cose
A criminal defendant has no more of a right to advisory appellate counsel than to advisory
counsel at trial. Downey v. People,' which addresses a claim that advisory appellate counsel
was ineffective, adopts the language of the decisions addressing advisory trial counsel. The trial
court had appointed an attorney to act as advisory appellate counsel and "after a partially suc-
cessful appeal, Downey filed a Crim.R 35(c) motion claiming ineffective assistance of his advi-
sory appellate counsel."2
This 35(c) motion was filed in the trial court and the trial court took testimony concerning
the precise nature of the role advisory counsel played. The conclusion of the trial court was that
counsel began in a purely advisory role but, after seeing the first draft of the brief Downey was
planning to file, negotiated with Downey about the nature of his role, and wrote most of the
brief that eventually was filed. However, the trial court found that Downey retained control over
what issues were addressed in the brief and had veto power over the final product. The trial
court therefore rejected Downey's argument that advisory counsel had inserted himself into the
appeal to such a degree that he should be treated as if he was counsel of record.
The Colorado Supreme Court accepted the trial court's factual finding that counsel remained
in the status of advisory counsel, and this factual conclusion compelled the legal conclusion:
"Under these circumstances, Downey could not maintain a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel against his advisory appellate counsel." 3
1. Downey v. People, 25 R3d 1200 (Colo. 2001).
2. Id. at 1202.
3. Id. at 1206.
(ABA) Standards Relating to the Function
of the Trial Judge.13 The Standards rec-
ommend that a trial court should consider
appointing advisory counsel whenever a
defendant elects to proceed pro se, and
should appoint advisory counsel whenev-
er a case is complicated. 14 The Colorado
Supreme Court agreed that "that the ap-
pointment of advisory counsel is generally
a fair and commendable practice," but re-
fused to mandate such an appointment,
holding instead that the decision whether
to appoint advisory counsel rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court.
15
This basic principle remains un-
changed. The judge's discretion to appoint
advisory counsel is so broad that the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that a trial
court has the authority to appoint adviso-
ry counsel even over the defendant's ob-
jection "to aid the accused if and when the
accused requests help, and to be available
to represent the accused in the event that
termination of the defendant's self-repre-
sentation is necessary."16 Similarly, the
Colorado Court ofAppeals has held that a
"trial court is not precluded from appoint-
ing counsel at any stage of the proceed-
ings if apro se defendant is so grossly in-
ept as to deny himself meaningful repre-
sentation." 7 The accused in this situation
is not under any obligation to seek or ac-
cept help from appointed advisory coun-
sel.18
The authority of a trial court to appoint
advisory counsel also stems from the in-
herent authority of the trial court to run
trials in a manner that ensures the pro-
ceedings are fair. This concern may justi-
fy the appointment of advisory counsel.
The old adage, "One who represents him-
self has a fool for a client" 19 recognizes the
likelihood that apro se defendant will con-
duct an inadequate defense. As the
Supreme Court has acknowledged, a
layperson:
is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.
... He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge adequately to prepare his defense
... [and] faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to estab-
lish his innocence.
20
Although this reasoning was used to jus-
tify the appointment of counsel for indi-
gent defendants, it also supports the ap-
pointment of advisory or hybrid counsel,
who can take over if necessary.
A judge's authority to appoint also may
be based on the judge's duty to ensure
that cases progress in an orderly fash-
ion.2 1 Apro se defendant, unfamiliar with
30 / The Colorado Lawyer / December 2006 / Vol. 35, No. 12
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rules and procedures, is more likely to
cause delays and disruptions at trial. In
United States v. Mack,22 the trial court de-
clined to appoint advisory counsel for an
extremely disruptive pro se defendant.
When the defendant eventually was
banned from the courtroom due to his dis-
ruptive behavior, there was no one to give
a closing argument for the defendant. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
his removal constituted grounds for a new
trial because the defendant "wound up de-
prived of counsel-himself or anyone
else."n
The appointment of advisory counsel
may help ensure that a pro se defendant
does not strain overburdened resources by
presenting untenable theories and sub-
mitting frivolous motions. Hybrid counsel
may be better able to perform this func-
tion. The appointment of stand-by counsel
can solve the problem of the defendant
who initially chooses to proceedpro se, but
later changes his mind and seeks-and
needs-the help of counsel.
The appointment of advisory counsel
also may reduce the danger of the judge or
the prosecutor being placed in the uncom-
fortable position of attempting to assist a
pro se defendant who is struggling and
likely to unintentionally create a miscar-
riage ofjustice. Advisory counsel can as-
sist the defendant in such matters. "Par-
ticipation by counsel to steer a defendant
through the basic procedures of trial is
permissible" even ifit undermines the de-
fendant's appearance of control over his or
her defense.24 Again, however, hybrid
counsel might be better able to perform
this function.
In determining whether to appoint ad-
visory counsel, judges should consider the
seriousness of the charge, the complexity
of the case, and the defendant's criminal
experience and ability to represent him-
self or herself 25 One observer has argued
that advisory counsel should be appoint-
ed in every criminal case to ensure that
defendants have access to an adequate de-
fense, prevent courts from being tempted
to act in place of defense attorneys for pro




The precise role of advisory counsel
varies from case to case. It is clear that ad-
visory counsel is not expected to be the
functional equivalent of retained or court-
appointed counsel. In People v. Haynie, the
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scope of representation by advisory coun-
sel should be equal to that guaranteed in-
digent defendants represented by public
defenders."27 A pro se defendant has the
right to control the theory of the defense,
pretrial motions, and the actual presenta-
tion at trial. On the other hand, advisory
counsel is supposed to assist the pro se de-
fendant navigate these difficult waters.
The result is that there are no clear lines
as to precisely what advisory counsel
should or should not-and must or must
not-do. As noted, trial judges can exer-
cise control over the scope of advisory
counsel's role, because they need not ap-
point advisory counsel at all.
28
The Colorado Court of Appeals has de-
scribed the role of advisory counsel as be-
ing merely the functional equivalent of a
law library or alternative sources of legal
knowledge.29 In People v. Rice, the court
observed:
On examining the record, we note that
throughout the proceedings, the defen-
The Colorado Lawyer / December 2006 / Vol. 35, No. 12 / 31
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dant either was represented by counsel,
or after he chose to represent himself
had a "standby" counsel available to
provide secretarial assistance and pro-
vide .. legal material if requested.
Hence, the defendant was at no time de-
prived of "access to a law library or alter-
native source of legal knowledge." 30 The
court also has approved a description of
advisory counsel as "only as a resource for
defendant" who "would not actively par-
ticipate in the trial."
31
However, this interpretation of the role
of advisory counsel does not seem to com-
port with other cases suggesting that ad-
visory counsel serves as more than just a
law library. The U.S. Supreme Court has
been unwilling to categorically bar advi-
sory counsel from participating in the
presence of the jury In McKaskle v. Wig-
gins,32 the Court reasoned that a defen-
dant's constitutional right to proceed pro
se is not violated when counsel provides
assistance in complying with procedural
and evidentiary matters, as long as the
defendant retains control over the de-
fense. Moreover, a defendant may waive
the right to represent himself or herself by
allowing counsel to participate in front of
the jury with tacit or express approval. 3
If the defendant chooses to let counsel
participate in this manner, he or she may
not later assert that counsel interfered
with the right to proceed pro se.34 The
Court cautioned that a trial judge need
not permit this type of "hybrid represen-
tation" and that it should not "serve as a
model for future trials."
35
Although advisory counsel may be
more than a law library, the defendant
who proceeds pro se should retain com-
mand of the case. McKaskle makes it clear
that the defendant's right of self-repre-
sentation is violated by the appointment
of advisory counsel over the defendant's
objection if the defendant did not have "a
fair chance to present his case in his own
way."36 The pro se defendant must be al-
lowed to:
control the organization and content of
his own defense, to make motions, to ar-
gue points of law, to participate in voir
dire, to question witnesses, and to ad-
dress the court and the jury at appro-
priate points in the trial.
3
The trial court should not, over the ac-
cused's objections, impose counsel on the
accused by permitting advisory counsel to
examine and cross-examine witnesses or
make arguments.36 If the defendant
chooses to let stand-by counsel take over
some portion of the trial proceeding, the
trial court should clarify with the accused
and counsel whether counsel is taking
over all, or just some limited portion, of
the defense.
The Supreme Court was unwilling in
McKaskle to conclude that advisory coun-
sel should be categorically barred from
participating in any portion of the pro-
ceeding that occurs in the presence of the
jury.3 9 The Court reasoned that a defen-
dant's right to proceed pro se is not violat-
ed when counsel assists in complying with
procedural and evidentiary matters, be-
cause the defendant retains control over
the defense. Clearly, when advisory coun-
sel and the defendant disagree, disputes
should be resolved in favor of the defen-
dant.40
One approved limit on the in-court role
of advisory counsel has been to preclude
counsel from interrupting "the proceed-
ings to 'coach' [the] defendant" but to al-
low "recesses or in-court consultations up-
on defendant's request."41 Clearly, such an
approach is disruptive and can become
time consuming.
Finally, the trial court must make it
clear to the jury that the defendant is rep-
resenting himself or herself.42 The Mc-
Kaskle court was particularly concerned
with the actions of counsel that took place
in front of the jury because the "defen-
dant's appearance in the status of one
conducting his own defense is important
in a criminal trial, since the right to ap-
pear pro se exists to affirm the accused's
individual dignity and autonomy " 43 The
Court noted with approval that the trial
judge made it clear to the jury, whenever
counsel got involved, that the defendant
retained control of the case. 44 Colorado
trial judges have broad discretion over the
scope of advisory counsel's role, because a
state court defendant is not constitution-
ally entitled to the appointment of advis-




The state legislature has explicitly ex-
cluded the Public Defender (PD.) from ac-
cepting an appointment as advisory coun-
sel.46 This exclusion appears to preclude
the appointment of the Alternate Defense
Counsel (A.D.C.), as well, because an
A-D.C. appointment is premised on the ex-
istence of eligibility for a P.D. appoint-
ment. Therefore, private counsel are ap-
pointed as advisory counsel by the trial
court and paid by the judicial depart-
ment.
47
The ethical obligation of defense coun-
sel to accept an appointment to represent
a criminal defendant stems, in part, from
the fact that such representation is guar-
anteed by the Constitution and all
lawyers have an obligation to help protect
constitutional rights.4" Because there is
no constitutional right to advisory coun-
sel, the question of whether counsel is un-
der an ethical obligation to accept an ap-
pointment as advisory counsel is some-
what different. Although no Colorado case
has specifically addressed this question, it
would seem that counsel has an ethical
and professional duty to accept appoint-
ment as advisory counsel and, if counsel
wishes to challenge such an appointment,
should do so through the appellate
process rather than by refusing the ap-
pointment.
General Ethical Guidelines
Counsel who have accepted appoint-
ment as advisory counsel face a number
of ethical and professional concerns. There
are no ethical guidelines specific to advi-
sory counsel, and there are no Colorado
decisions addressing the ethical issues
faced by advisory counsel. If there is a con-
clusion that comes out of the following dis-
cussion, it is this: advisory counsel should
follow the same ethical rules they would
follow if they had been retained or ap-
pointed in the traditional manner.
It is unethical for a lawyer to "offer evi-
dence that the lawyer knows to be false."49
A retained or appointed defense lawyer
simply should refuse to call a witness the
lawyer knows is going to present perjured
testimony. Advisory counsel in this situa-
tion should attempt to persuade the
"client" not to offer such evidence, but can-
not preclude the action. This situation
may put advisory counsel in the uncom-
fortable position of standing silent while
perjured testimony is offered. If the per-
suasion fails, the best course of action is
for advisory counsel to seek permission to
withdraw, without revealing to the court
the specific reason withdrawal is being re-
quested.50 The same analysis would seem
to apply to the requirement that a lawyer
must "disclose a material fact to a tribu-
nal when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by
the client"f 5 1 and to the rule that a lawyer
may not allude in trial to "any matter that
the lawyer does not believe is relevant or
that will be supported by admissible evi-
dence."
52
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The duty to act in a professional man-
ner is closely connected to the duty to act
in an ethical manner. The first rule of the
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct
states: "A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client." 3 Advisory
counsel, like counsel in any other situa-
tion, must do his or her best to represent
the client competently and effectively.
Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel and Malpractice
Apro se defendant may not assert an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim
against advisory counsel who does not ex-
ceed the advisory role, because the defen-
dant does not have a constitutional right
to advisory counsel.5 However, if counsel
exercises a broader role-one that more
closely resembles the traditional defense
counsel role-during some or all of the
proceedings, the defendant may have a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.5
Here again, it is in the best interests of all
parties if the precise nature of the role of
advisory counsel is delineated as clearly
as possible at the outset of the appoint-
ment. If counsel exercises a broader role,
he or she must comply with the relevant
ethical standards, just as if counsel was
acting in the traditional capacity.
The question of whether a defendant
has an ineffective assistance claim
against advisory counsel does not answer
the question of whether the defendant
has a malpractice claim against advisory
counsel. There are no Colorado cases ad-
dressing malpractice claims against advi-
sory counsel. Regardless of whether the
defendant has an ineffective assistance
claim, the defendant is entitled to compe-
tent representation by advisory counsel,
and advisory counsel is under an ethical
obligation to competently perform all
work.
56
The Role of Prosecutors
The fact that a defendant is proceeding
pro se, with or without advisory counsel,
does not relieve prosecutors of their ethi-
cal or professional obligations. It may, in
fact, increase those obligations. A pro se
defendant almost certainly raises difficult
challenges for prosecutors who may be
tempted to "help" apro se defendant more
than they would help a represented de-
fendant, to ensure that procedural justice
is achieved while, at the same time, vigor-
ously pursuing the conviction that they
believe to be the just result in the case.
The Colorado Rules of Professional
Conduct address the issue of pro se defen-
dants in only one sentence, in Rule 3.8,
which bars prosecutors from seeking to
obtain waivers of important pretrial
rights from unrepresented defendants,
"except that this does not apply to a de-
fendant appearing pro se with the ap-
proval of the tribunal." Presumably, the
exception is intended to make clear that
prosecutors may speak with unrepresent-
ed defendants on this particular topic and
not to open the door to any communica-
tions that otherwise would be banned. In
light of these ethical and professional obli-
gations, it may well be that prosecutors
must modify their standard practices to




At the outset, the prosecutor, like the
court and advisory counsel, has an inter-
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est in clarifying the role of advisory coun-
sel. For example, the parties should clarify
the role of advisory counsel in connection
with communications between the prose-
cutor and the defendant. It may be diffi-
cult, as a purely practical matter, for a
prosecutor to communicate directly with
the defendant, particularly one who is in
custody. Advisory counsel may be able to
facilitate this process.
Prosecutors may have difficulty with
the substance of communications, as well.
Plea negotiations are an example. A plea
offer may be premised on the likelihood of
success of a pretrial motion. Such a pre-
diction can be fairly evaluated by defense
counsel, but not by apro se defendant. Ad-
visory counsel can provide an experienced
opinion on such matters, and prosecutors
should consider how to use advisory coun-
sel in this regard. If required to deal di-
rectly with the defendant, prosecutors
should urge the defendant to consult with
advisory counsel about any offers that are
made.
Trial Issues
Problems that implicate the ethical and
professional obligations of prosecutors
likely will arise at trial, as well. A pro se
defendant may be unable to introduce a
document or exhibit that the prosecutor
knows is admissible if the correct founda-
tion is laid. If advisory counsel is allowed
to take a hybrid role and help the defen-
dant in court, the problem may be over-
come. If advisory counsel cannot do so, the
prosecutor's independent obligation to
seek the truth may require him or her to
help the defendant. A prosecutor has no
such obligation when there is counsel of
record, because the defendant has a cause
of action for ineffective assistance. Be-
cause the defendant waives any claim of
ineffective assistance by choosing to pro-
ceed pro se, one response to this situation
is simply to say that the defendant has
voluntarily assumed the risk of his or her
own incompetence. However, the prosecu-
tor's obligation to seek justice should be
viewed as independent of any such waiver
by the defendant.
There are other trial scenarios in which
a pro se defendant's actions might impli-
cate the ethical and professional duty of a
prosecutor. What if a prosecution witness,
in response to a completely proper ques-
tion, starts giving a clearly objectionable
answer? What if a prosecutor, in the heat
of battle, asks a clearly objectionable ques-
tion? "The duty of the district attorney ex-
tends not only to marshalling and pre-
senting evidence to obtain a conviction,
but also to protecting... the accused from
having a conviction result from mislead-
ing evidence."
57
One framework for addressing these
questions may be to distinguish between
"passively" and "actively" taking advan-
tage of the blunders of a pro se defendant
whose advisory counsel cannot intervene.
It could be argued that a prosecutor
would be acting unprofessionally and un-
ethically by taking affirmative steps to
take advantage of the defendant's lack of
legal skills. It is one thing to remain silent
while the defendant blunders; it is quite
another to file motions or ask questions or
take other steps that the prosecutor
knows would be objected to by counsel
simply because the prosecutor believes
the defendant would fail to object. In other
words, there is nothing unprofessional or
unethical with passively taking advan-
tage of the defendant's decision to proceed
pro se, but it is improper to actively take
advantage of that decision.
The Role of the Court
The problems facing trial judges presid-
ing over cases in which the defendant is
proceeding pro se with advisory counsel
are sometimes similar to the problems
facing prosecutors and sometimes unique
to the court. Trial courts "clearly have the
responsibility to ensure that a criminal
defendant receives a fair trial ... as well
as the latitude to ensure the integrity, and
appearance of integrity, of the process."' s
The ABA Standards cited with approval
in Reliford59 mandate that the trial court
"take whatever measures may be reason-
able and necessary to ensure a fair trial
for a pro se litigant."60 The question is
whether a trial court's obligation to pro-
tect against miscarriages ofjustice over-
rides the right of a criminal defendant to
proceed pro se. As previously noted, Mc-
Kaskle permitted participation by adviso-
ry counsel to steer the pro se defendant
through basic trial procedures, even when
doing so undermined the defendant's ap-
pearance of control over his defense.
61
The first step a trial judge should take
is to fully advise the potential pro se de-
fendant of all of the pitfalls of proceeding
pro se. A trial judge who thinks that pro-
ceeding pro se is a bad idea may well be
tempted to bend over backward to dis-
suade the defendant from proceeding pro
se. A judge, like prosecutors, may feel torn
between equally important ethical and
professional duties, in a manner different
from when the defendant is represented.
A trial court does not exceed its discre-
tion in denying a request to proceedpro se
that is not timely or unequivocal. 62 A waiv-
er of the right to counsel must be made
knowingly and intelligently and the trial
court must ensure that a defendant is
aware of the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation.63 There is a series of
questions that trial courts should ask be-
fore allowing a defendant to proceed pro
se,64 and this inquiry could be expanded to
include a discussion about the possibility
of appointing advisory counsel. On the
other hand, because there is no right to
advisory counsel, there is no requirement
that the trial court advise a defendant
about the possibility of such an appoint-
ment, and such an advisement actually
might increase the likelihood that the de-
fendant will choose to proceedpro se.
Because a defendant wishing to pro-
ceedpro se is not entitled to the assistance
of advisory counsel, it would seem logical
that a trial judge has the authority to con-
dition the appointment of advisory coun-
sel on the defendant's agreement as to the
rules relating to the function of advisory
counsel. The power to deny an appoint-
ment entirely includes the power to put
conditions on such an appointment.
65 If
this is the case, the trial court may be able
to negotiate with the defendant about the
authority of advisory counsel in an effort
to reduce the danger of a miscarriage of
justice.
Assuming that the defendant has been
allowed to proceedpro se and that the role
of advisory counsel precludes counsel from
intervening in court, does the trial court
nonetheless have an obligation to protect
the right of the defendant and/or to pre-
vent a miscarriage ofjustice that will oc-
cur due to the defendant's choice to pro-
ceed pro se? Just as with prosecutors, one
simple answer is that the court has no ad-
ditional duty beyond advising the defen-
dant of the difficulties and dangers of pro-
ceeding pro se. The many pitfalls of pro-
ceeding pro se are, after all, the reason
trial judges are required to give such a
thorough advisement to a defendant wish-
ing to proceed pro se, and the defendant "is
bound by his choices, however ill-advised
they may be."6 Perhaps, however, the an-
swer is more difficult. Like prosecutors,
trial judges have an independent ethical
obligation to stop miscarriages ofjustice
from occurring,67 and this may require
them to alter their normal procedures to
help the pro se defendant avoid plain er-
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rors without improper favoritism. Some of
the suggestions made herein for prosecu-
tors may apply to trial judges, as well.
Although apro se defendant must com-
ply with the rules of evidence and proce-
dure, the court need not inform him of her
of the substantive law and applicable
rules. As a result, pro se defendants lose
the right to appeal issues if they fail to re-
quest a record of opening and closing ar-
guments68 and a record of the complete
proceeding.69 Presumably, the rule that a
reviewing court can take notice of plain
error and reverse on that ground regard-
less of whether the issue was properly
preserved at trial, applies with full force
to apro se defendant.
70
An exception to the general rule that
judges need not inform pro se defendants
of the applicable rules is the right against
self-incrimination. The Curtis rule applies
to pro se defendants.
71
Conclusion
A defendant who proceeds pro se may
face an increased risk of conviction. For
these reasons, trial courts must carefully
and thoroughly advise pro se defendants
of the right to counsel, as well as the pit-
falls of proceeding pro se. In appropriate
cases, trial courts should consider the ap-
pointment of advisory counsel. When ad-
visory counsel is appointed, all parties-
the defendant, the court, the advisory
counsel, and the prosecutor-have an in-
terest in making sure that the boundaries
of advisory counsel's role are defined as
clearly as possible. The trial court, the ad-
visory counsel, and the prosecutor all
must consider whether there exists an in-
dependent professional or ethical duty to
step in to avoid miscarriages ofjustice.
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